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ORGAN QUALITY AS A COMPLICATING 
FACTOR IN PROPOSED SYSTEMS OF 
INDUCEMENTS FOR ORGAN DONATION 
MICHAEL L. VOLK* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
All potentially transplantable organs are not created equally. Even among 
organs currently used for transplantation, there exists a wide spectrum of 
quality. Donor risk factors can account for as much as a twenty-percent 
absolute difference in post-transplant survival.1 Thus, in some cases, actual 
receipt of a transplant matters less than the quality of organ received. 
Organ quality might complicate inducements for organ donation in several 
ways. First, organ quality can diminish the impact of inducements on net 
increase in organs transplanted, and furthermore, can increase the cost of 
inducements. Second, whether directed toward organ-procurement 
organizations or potential living or deceased donors, inducements risk 
increasing the supply of organs at the expense of quality. Finally, the 
heterogeneous quality of organs can complicate market systems. 
These issues are most relevant to deceased-donor organs, and can be less 
problematic in the setting of living donation. Furthermore, there are a number 
of potential regulatory mechanisms that could mitigate concerns related to 
organ quality. 
II 
WHAT IS ORGAN QUALITY? 
For the potential recipient of a solid organ transplant, whether from the 
deceased or living, two types of donor-specific risks exist: (1) risk of disease 
transmission, such as infection or malignancy, and (2) risk of graft failure. Of 
the two, the latter risk is both more common and more harmful. Among 
potential donors, the prevalence of transmissible diseases is approximately ten 
percent,2 and, since donor-screening methods are fairly effective, disease 
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 1.  See S. Feng et al., Characteristics Associated with Liver Graft Failure: The Concept of a Donor 
Risk Index, 6 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 783, 786–89 (2006). 
 2.  See K. Ellingson et al., Estimated Risk of Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Hepatitis C 
Virus Infection Among Potential Organ Donors from 17 Organ Procurement Organizations in the 
United States, 11 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 1201, 1206 (2011); M. A. Nalesnik et al., Donor-
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transmission occurs in just under one percent of transplantation cases, causing 
nine deaths in 2007.2,3 By contrast, risk factors for graft failure are present in 
more than two-thirds of actual donors, and are even more common in the 
overall population of potential donors.4 These risk factors include donor age, 
type and cause of death, and medical comorbidities, all of which not only affect 
pre-transplant organ function, but also make the organ more susceptible to 
ischemic injury during procurement and storage.5 Among deceased-donor 
organs currently used for transplantation, donor-specific risk factors account for 
an absolute difference of twenty percent in risk of graft failure for the recipient.6 
For example, an average-risk recipient of a liver transplant will have a twenty-
percent risk of graft failure with a high-quality organ, and a forty-percent risk of 
graft failure with a low-quality organ.7 Because re-transplantation is often not 
possible, in many cases graft failure means death for the recipient. Thus, even 
conservative estimates implicate donor risk factors for graft failure as causing 
more than 1000 deaths each year.8 For these reasons, studies show that, when 
faced with an offer of a below-average-quality organ, some patients are actually 
better off declining that offer in order to wait for a better one.9 
III 
HOW DOES ORGAN QUALITY AFFECT ORGAN UTILIZATION? 
In 2011, only 3.5% of Americans who died while hospitalized became organ 
donors.10 Poor organ quality prevented many prospective donations—organs 
from most deceased people are not usable.11 For example, two of the most 
important risk factors for graft failure are donor age and type of death. Donor 
age over seventy years increases the risk of graft failure by 20–60% depending 
upon the type of organ and other factors, whereas donation after circulatory 
death (DCD) increases the risk by 50–70% compared to donation after brain 
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 4.  Feng, supra note 1, at 784–86. 
 5.  See Feng, supra note 1, at 784–85; Panduranga S. Rao et al., A Comprehensive Risk 
Quantification Score for Deceased Donor Kidneys: The Kidney Donor Risk Index, 88 
TRANSPLANTATION 231, 231, 233 (2009). 
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25 (2008). 
 10.  UNITED STATES ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION, OPTN & SRTR ANNUAL DATA REPORT 2011 
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death (DBD).12 Thus, although individuals with one or both of these 
characteristics account for 95% of deaths, they contribute less than 5% of donor 
organs.13 This is not because the individuals or their families decline donation. 
Rather, transplant centers are not willing to use their organs, and in most cases 
their families are not even approached for consent. Furthermore, among 
individuals who do become donors, meaning that they donate at least one 
organ, not all of their organs are procured, and 10% of those procured are 
discarded—again, for reasons of organ quality.14 In 2011, 79% of eligible deaths 
consented for donation.15 Therefore, as shown in the following table that uses 





Total deaths in the United States 2,513,171 
Age <70 and brain death 9023 
Met above criteria and consented for donation 7128 
 
 
The Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN) has 
developed a series of metrics for quantifying donation activity—donation rate, 
organs recovered per donor, organs transplanted per donor, discard rate—each 
of which is influenced by donor risk factors for graft failure.17 Similarly, in the 
case of disease transmission, donors with behavioral risk factors for recently 
acquired infection are given the status “Centers for Disease Control high risk:” 
Organs from these donors are used less frequently than organs without this 
label.18 
IV 
HOW COULD ORGAN QUALITY COMPLICATE INDUCEMENTS FOR DONATION? 
Within the context of inducements, the relationship between organ quality 
and organ utilization has four implications, which vary somewhat depending on 
the type of donation—deceased versus living—as well as the target of the 
inducement—the patient, family, or health care provider. The majority of the 
 
 12.  SCIENTIFIC REGISTRY OF TRANSPLANT, RECIPIENTS RISK MODEL DOCUMENTATION (2014), 
available at http://www.srtr.org/csr/current/Centers/201402_1401/modtabs/Risk/LIADC2G.pdf. 
 13.  OPTN & SRTR ANNUAL DATA REPORT 2011, supra note 10, at 181. 
 14.  OPTN & SRTR, ANNUAL DATA REPORT: DECEASED ORGAN DONATION (2011), available 
at http://srtr.transplant.hrsa.gov/annual_reports/2011/pdf/07_dod_12.pdf. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  OPTN & SRTR ANNUAL DATA REPORT 2011, supra note 10, at 181. 
 18.  K. I. Duan et al., Centers for Disease Contro ‘High-Risk’ Donors and Kidney Utilization, 10 
AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 416, 416, 418 (2010). 
VOLK_FORMATTED_CHANTBOX 11/11/2014  4:06 PM 
340 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 77:337 
organ-quality concerns are most relevant to deceased-organ donation, however. 
First, the winnowing effect of organ quality could dilute the beneficial 
impact of the inducements on the volume of organs actually used for 
transplantation. This issue would be most relevant to deceased donation: As 
described above, the majority of deaths do not result in donation for reasons of 
organ quality. If inducements were to yield more people being willing to 
donate, but their organs were not to be used, then the ultimate goal of 
increasing transplantation would not be achieved. 
Second, organ quality could affect the cost-effectiveness of an inducement 
system. This issue would be relevant for both deceased and living donation. 
Consider, for example, a system that covers funeral expenses if a family were to 
agree to donate their loved one’s organ. Would the payment occur regardless of 
whether the organs were actually to be used? If so, there would be many more 
payments than actual donations. If payment were contingent upon organ 
utilization, however, this could lead to dissatisfaction and perceptions of 
discrimination among families. 
Third, inducements could increase the supply of organs at the expense of 
quality. This issue would be relevant for deceased donation and, to a lesser 
extent, living donation. Additional lower-quality organs might be used for 
transplantation, resulting in poor patient outcomes, or the inducements could 
even alter procurement patterns in such a way as to decrease the quality of 
existing organs. The transmission of infectious diseases through reliance on 
lower-quality organs and the increased utilization of cardiac death donors (who 
might have progressed to brain death and are therefore more likely to donate 
lower-quality organs) are two examples of poor patient outcomes or altered 
procurement patterns that could occur with an increased supply of lower-
quality organs. 
A. Example 1: Transmission of infectious diseases 
Although uncommon, the risk of transmitting infectious diseases such as 
HIV and viral hepatitis via transplantation causes great concern to recipients, 
transplant centers, and the general public. The most recent known transmission 
from a deceased donor, in 2007, was the source of numerous news articles and 
several lawsuits.19 Each donor is extensively tested, but these tests can be falsely 
negative if the donor has recently acquired the infection. The “window” period 
for failing to detect recent infections ranges from one week to three months 
depending on the virus and type of test performed.20 The more sensitive the test, 
the higher the risk of false positives, and of wasting perfectly good organs. Thus, 
the risk of disease transmission always exists. 
Because the diagnostic tests are not perfect, current practice relies heavily 
 
 19.  See S. D. Halpern et al., Informing Candidates for Solid-Organ Transplantation About Donor 
Risk Factors, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2832, 2832 (2008). 
 20.  L. M. Kucirka et al., Risk of Window Period Hepatitis-C Infection in High Infectious Risk 
Donors: Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, 11 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 1188, 1189 (2011). 
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on screening potential donors for behavioral risk factors. Donor families—or in 
the case of living donation, the donors themselves—are queried about recent 
drug use, sexual activity, and other risk factors for transmissible diseases. This 
screening presumes that donors and their families answer honestly. A recent 
case of HIV transmission from a living donor highlighted the fragility of this 
presumption.21 In that case, the donor failed to disclose his high-risk behavior 
and acquired HIV between evaluation and donation, thereby transmitting the 
infection to the recipient.22 It is easy to envision how financial inducements for 
donation could lead potential donors (or their families) to prevaricate, thus 
increasing the screening process’s inability to detect the likelihood of a window-
period transmission. 
B. Example 2: The case of DCD organs 
Inducements might be aimed not only at donors and their families, but also 
at health care providers; in the latter case, recent history provides an example of 
how these inducements can have unintended consequences. Recall from part III 
that organs obtained through DCD can increase the risk of graft failure during 
transplantation by fifty to seventy percent in comparison to organs obtained 
through DBD.  DCD is classified as controlled when cardiopulmonary arrest 
occurs in the setting of planned withdrawal of care (Maastricht type 3), and 
uncontrolled when cardiopulmonary arrest occurs unexpectedly (Maastricht 
types 1, 2 and 4).23 For logistical reasons and due to ethical concerns about 
donation in the uncontrolled setting, most DCD occurs in a planned fashion in 
the intensive care unit (ICU).24 The past two decades have seen significant 
advances in surgical techniques for DCD transplantation and improved 
consensus among the transplant community regarding ethical protocols, such as 
strict separation between the ICU and transplant teams.25 As such, DCD has 
begun to be viewed as an increasingly viable alternative for expanding the 
donor pool—despite their lower quality. 
The Organ Donation Breakthrough Collaborative, a program sponsored by 
the Department of Health and Human Services, set as one of its goals an 
increase in rates of DCD transplantation.26 As a result, DCD was added to the 
metrics by which Organ Procurement Organizations are judged. Possibly due to 
these efforts, as well as due to increased comfort and familiarity among the 
 
 21.  See generally Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, HIV Transmitted from a Living Organ 
Donor—New York City, 2009, 60 MORBIDITY MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 298, 298–301 (2011). 
 22.  See id. 
 23.  Peter L. Abt et al., Donation After Cardiac Death in the US: History and Use, 203 J. AM. COLL. 
SURGEONS 208, 208 (2006). 
 24.  See id. at 209. 
 25.  See generally D. J. Reich et al., ASTS Recommended Practice Guidelines for Controlled 
Donation After Cardiac Death Organ Procurement and Transplantation, 9 AM. J. TRANSPLANTATION 
2004 (2009).  
 26.  Teresa J. Shafer et al., Organ Donation Breakthrough Collaborative: Increasing Organ 
Donation Through System Redesign, CRITICAL CARE NURSE, Apr. 2006, at 33, 34. 
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transplant and intensive-care communities, DCD increased from 1.1% of 
donors in 1995 to 11.2% in 2010.27 However, this increase is associated with a 
proportional decline in the numbers of DBD, and a decrease in the number of 
organs transplanted per donor.28 These trends lead many experts to fear that the 
push for DCD is causing life support to be withdrawn among individuals who 
would have progressed to brain death given more time.29 In other words, 
potential donors via DBD are being converted to donors via DCD. Thus, in this 
case, inducements aimed at health care providers might lead to an increased 
total number of donors but a decrease in the pool of good-quality donors. 
To clarify, aside from the unique situation of DCD organs, it is unlikely that 
inducements aimed at donors or families would adversely impact the pool of 
good-quality organs—rather, inducements are likely to expand the pool of total 
organs by a disproportionate increase in the pool of lower-quality organs. The 
only possible way that inducements might decrease the number of good-quality 
organs would be via a negative incentive for charitable donors. That is, financial 
incentives might partially erase the motivation for certain individuals to donate 
as a gift or sacrifice, and these individuals might also tend to have the highest-
quality organs. However, there is no evidence that such a situation would likely 
occur. 
Finally, the variation in organ quality and the resulting heterogeneity in 
value among organs might complicate the development of organ markets, 
whether for living or deceased donation.  Any type of inducement for donation 
would create an organ market—a system where parties engage in exchange. 
This could take the form of financial or nonfinancial reimbursement to donors 
or their families for the act of donation, or it could take the form of organ 
exchanges, such as paired donation or donor chains. However, such systems 
would be complicated by the fact that organs are not commodities—in the sense 
that they are not interchangeable with one another—and thus might have 
differential value. For example, paired donation occurs when one living person 
wants to donate a kidney to his or her intended recipient (pair A), but their 
blood types are not compatible.30 In order to overcome this problem, another 
aspiring donor and recipient are identified (pair B) with the same problem. 
Donor A donates to recipient B, while donor B donates to recipient A. Donor 
chains are simply an extension of this concept—donor A donates to recipient B, 
donor B donates to recipient C, and donor C donates to recipient A.31 This 
might seem an ideal solution to a biological problem until one considers the 
 
 27.  Eric S. Orman et al., Declining Liver Utilization for Transplantation in the United States and the 
Impact of Donation After Cardiac Death, 19 LIVER TRANSPLANTATION 59, 61 (2013). 
 28.  See id. 
 29.  Id. at 66. 
 30.  For additional discussion of paired-kidney exchanges, see Philip J. Cook & Kimberly D. 
Krawiec, A Primer on Kidney Transplantation: Anatomy of the Shortage, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 
no. 3, 2014 at 1. 
 31.  See Michael A. Rees et al., A Nonsimultaneous, Extended, Altruistic-Donor Chain, 360 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 1096, 1096–97 (2009). 
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issue of organ quality. If donor A were young and healthy, and donor C were 
old and unhealthy, organ quality would be discordant between the two pairs. 
Such an arrangement would not be fair or satisfactory to pair A, because donor 
A’s kidney might last on average ten years longer than the kidney from donor C 
would. Many programs have rules in place to prevent recipients in kidney-pair 
donation pools from receiving a lower-quality organ than they would have 
gotten from their paired donor. 
Extending this concept to the setting of financial inducements for donation 
leads to many questions and complications. For example, would the amount of 
the inducement need to be adjusted for the quality of the organ, and if so, who 
would set these prices—the regulatory body or the free market? Ultimately, 
inducements might be set at fixed amounts to cover only the financial costs of 
the donors, but even then, would donors be liable for failure to disclose risk 
factors for poor organ quality? Clearly, organ markets would be much simpler 
to design if all organs were interchangeable. 
V 
THE SPECIAL CASE OF LIVING-KIDNEY DONATION 
The medical risks of donating a kidney are relatively small—death rates are 
approximately one in 10,000—and the potential donor pool is large; therefore, 
inducements for living donors could have the most impact compared to 
deceased donation. Many of the organ-quality concerns would be less relevant 
in this situation because the majority of donors with substantial risk factors for 
graft failure, such as age and medical comorbidities, would be ruled out due to 
safety concerns.  In other words, these risk factors for graft failure are also risk 
factors for complications from donation, and these patients would thus be 
excluded from donating by the medical team. 
Furthermore, unless the sums involved were very large, it would be unlikely 
that inducements would motivate potential live donors to lie about their 
medical history. Unlike deceased donation, the live donor experiences 
significant inconvenience and discomfort because of transplantation and is at 
least partially motivated by the recipient’s interests. And, even if a recipient 
receives a slightly-lower-than-average-quality organ from a live donor as a 
result of inducements, she is likely better off than waiting years for a deceased-
donor organ. There are still regulatory concerns, such as constructing the 
inducement in a way that cannot be construed as “payment” in order to limit 
donor liability for poor recipient outcome. Nonetheless, the issue of organ 
quality is likely most problematic in the setting of deceased donation. 
VI 
REGULATORY MECHANISMS TO MITIGATE UNWANTED EFFECTS ON ORGAN 
QUALITY DUE TO INDUCEMENT 
Regulatory mechanisms could mitigate potential problems related to 
inducements and organ quality. The most immediate consideration would be 
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the format and size of inducements. To the extent that inducements are 
provided in the form of reimbursement for costs of donation and are 
maintained at a modest sum, the financial incentives for donation that could 
otherwise increase the volume of poor-quality organs are diminished. Or, rather 
than payment up-front, if living donors are required to submit receipts for their 
costs, this could make donation appear to be less of a money-making 
proposition and thus decrease the risk of prevarication. This structure would 
also decrease program costs, because payments would be only partial if the 
donor were ruled out during evaluation, and might limit donor liability for a 
poor recipient outcome. A similar approach could be taken for funeral costs in 
the case of deceased donation. 
A second mechanism to consider would be adjusting incentives for quality. 
For hospitals and organ-procurement organizations that stand to profit from 
organ donation, their reimbursement could be tied to the quality of the organ, 
using validated scoring systems.32 Likewise, donors or their families could be 
reimbursed on a sliding scale based upon organ quality. Linking quality to 
payment is not without precedent—compensation for egg donation can vary 
more than ten-fold, depending on characteristics of the donor.33 
A third, more radical approach would be to make inducements dependent 
upon the outcome of the recipient. Although potentially cumbersome to 
implement, this mechanism would significantly reduce any negative impact on 
organ quality and would also emphasize the ultimate goal: successful 
transplantation. Linking reimbursement to recipient outcome might also reduce 
the number of lawsuits against donors by recipients or their families. However, 
the uncertainty about receiving payment could be seen as a negative aspect for 
potential donors, particularly because they might correctly perceive that many 
factors determining outcome are beyond their control. This, plus the time delay 
required to ascertain outcome, could substantially dilute the magnitude of 
incentive for donation. For these reasons, tying reimbursement to quality 
metrics seems the more practical approach. 
VI 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, both living- and deceased-donor organs vary substantially in 
quality, meaning that the recipient’s risks of disease transmission and graft 
failure depend significantly on donor characteristics. This could complicate 
inducements for organ donation by diminishing the impact of inducements, by 
causing an increase in organ supply at the expense of quality, and by disrupting 
market arrangements. None of these risks is insurmountable, nor should any of 
them be used as an argument against inducements. Rather, system designs for 
 
 32.  Feng, supra note 1, at 784–85, 787; Rao, supra note 5, at 231–33, 236.  
 33.  Debora Spar, The Egg Trade—Making Sense of the Market for Human Oocytes, 356 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 1289, 1289 (2007). 
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donations should take organ quality into consideration and include features to 
mitigate these risks, such as linking reimbursement to organ quality. Ultimately, 
it is important to keep in mind the primary goal, which is not the number of 
donors, but rather the number of successful transplants. 
 
